I’ve written a number of times in the past about the growth of irregular warfare, particularly around the 4th Generation Warefare (4GW) concept developed by William Lind and others. For those interested, Small Wars Journal, a free ejournal, is an excellent resource.
While much of SWJ’s focus has been on the developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has had some enlightening coverage of the Mexican drug war.
For a military analysis of some recent developments, see John Sullivan and Adam Elkus’s Narco-Armor in Mexico:
Known alternatively as “narco-tanks” (narcotanques), “Rhino trucks,” and “monster trucks”(monstruos), the crude armored vehicles emerging in Mexico’s cartel war are evidence of a changing tactical logic on the ground. ”Narco-tanks” are better characterized as improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs)—portending a shift in the infantry-centric nature of the cartel battlespace….
Cartel tactics in Mexico, which began with assassinations and raiding missions bridging the gap between crime and irregular warfare, are looking more and more like conventional combined-arms and infantry and mechanized infantry missions. IAFVs can not only transport squads but—with armaments for gun turrets—also have the capacity to support them in firefights. –
For an interesting take on the US involvement in the conflict and the Mexican government’s approach, see Robert Haddick’s Outsourcing the Drug War.
Haddick discusses the “civilianization of warfare” in recent years and explains:
The use of unobtrusive civilian contractors is another consequence from the last decade of experience with irregular conflict…. Irregular adversaries have long taken on civilian guise in order to avoid the superior firepower usually wielded by nation-states. U.S. policymakers today find it politically untenable to use conventional military force, especially ground forces, against irregular adversaries. Increasingly more convenient are civilian substitutes such as CIA paramilitaries, contractors, and hired proxies. Mexico has long had severe cultural and legal prohibitions on a foreign military presence, especially from the United States. This will increasingly be the rule elsewhere in the world. But as we can see in Mexico and elsewhere, the U.S. government now has a well-established workaround.
He goes on to suggest that the Mexican government, afraid that any one cartel will become so strong as to actually create a dual power situation, competing with the government for control of the country (something Haddick calls the “Escobar Scenario” after the Columbian experience), is actually pursuing a strategy of keeping the cartels at war with one another and internally by targeting their top leaders, leaving the surviving members to fight for control. This strategy – aimed a dividing precisely because the government does not have the means to conquer – increases the bloodshed, at least in the short term, but allows the government to remain the most powerful player.
Haddick concludes:
Acceptance of more violence and drug traffic may seem little different than surrendering to the problem. But at this point, simply preventing a rival to state authority should be counted as success enough. The U.S. government’s intelligence contractors in Mexico will very likely make a critical contribution to that goal.
For more from Haddick on the civilianization of war, see his article at Foreign Policy The Rise of the Irregulars.
For my previous 4GW posts, see here.
Filed under: 4GW, Fourth Generation Warfare, Mexican drug wars, Mexico Tagged: | 4GW, mexican drug war, mexican drug wars, mexican violence, Mexico
